tantaman

The Recurring Pattern: Left-Islamist Alliances and the Triumph of Islam

Published 2026-01-12

Introduction: The Structural Logic of Temporary Alliance

The observation that leftist and Islamist movements form tactical alliances—only for the Islamists to subsequently destroy the left once power is consolidated—represents one of the most consistent patterns in 20th and 21st century political history. This pattern has repeated across Iran, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, and various other contexts with striking regularity. What follows is a documentation of this phenomenon through primary sources and direct quotations from the actors involved.

I. Iran: The Paradigmatic Case (1978–1988)

The Alliance Phase

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 brought together a broad coalition unified only by opposition to the Shah. As the Wikipedia summary of the aftermath notes:

“It is generally agreed that while Khomeini had shrewdly assembled and kept together a broad coalition to overthrow the shah, it contained many mutually incompatible elements, ‘liberals of Mussadeq’s old National Front, remnants of the communist Tudeh party, and the ‘new left’ movements, inspired by similar developments among Palestinian and Latin American youth...’ all of whom who had differences among each other and none of whom were interested in Khomeini’s plans for a theocracy.”

The Tudeh Party of Iran (the communist party) not only participated in the revolution but actively supported the new Islamic regime. According to declassified East German Stasi documents from November 1979, Tudeh General Secretary Noureddin Kianouri met with East German Politburo member Hermann Axen to discuss “the Iranian revolution and the place of the Tudeh Party within Khomeini’s Iran.”

The Soviet strategy, as documented in the Wilson Center’s archive of CPSU International Department records, was based on a theory developed by Rostislav Ulianovskii:

“For many in the Soviet leadership, Ayatollah Khomeini’s anti-Americanism was a sufficient reason for supporting the Iranian Revolution. Yet in Rostislav Ulianovskii’s view, the revolution gave Iran a much bigger opportunity: a chance to fit in the Soviet theoretical concept of ‘the non-capitalist path of development’. With this picture in mind Ulianovskii and the Tudeh Party developed a strategy of temporary support for Khomeini, expecting him to fulfil his temporary ‘objectively progressive’ role and give way to the truly ‘progressive’ forces.“

Khomeini’s Stated Position on the Left

Unlike the left’s ambiguous theorizing about “tactical alliances,” Khomeini was explicit about his intentions. In his most comprehensive political speech (published by MERIP in 1980), he declared:

“We are fighting against international communism to the same degree that we are fighting against the Western world — devourers led by America, Israel and Zionism. My dear friends, you should know that the danger from the communist powers is not less than America and the danger of America is such that if we show the slightest negligence we shall be destroyed.”

His ideological framework was equally clear:

“We wish to cause the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and Communism to wither throughout the world. We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the Islamic order of the Prophet... in the world of arrogance.”

On democracy itself, Khomeini stated on February 1, 1979:

“Don’t listen to those who speak of democracy. They all are against Islam. They want to take the nation away from its mission. We will break all the poison pens of those who speak of nationalism, democracy, and such things.”

And on September 19, 1979:

“These writings, these speeches, these wrong activities, these democratic programs are separations from Islam. All these voices are blasphemy and are atheistic.“

The Systematic Destruction

The sequential elimination of the left proceeded with methodical efficiency:

The crushing of the Tudeh Party in 1983 was particularly systematic. According to the Tudeh Party’s own statement on the 40th anniversary:

“Khomeini, following the implementation of this scenario, and in a message that was published in the Iranian daily newspapers, declared the attack on the Party and the arrest of a number of Party leaders as a great victory [Jomhuri-e-Islami newspaper, issue 1138, 5 May 1983]. Most of the country’s newspapers in those days and months were filled with telegrams, editorials, and articles confirming and congratulating the attack on the Party. The political sermons of all Friday prayers at that time were dedicated to describing the ‘treason of the Party.’”

According to British diplomat Nicholas Barrington’s correspondence (cited in Qantara.de):

“In May 1983, in a letter to the British Foreign Office, Barrington described the crushing of the Tudeh Party in Iran as ‘a major landmark has been reached in Soviet/Iranian relations and perhaps also in the history of Communist parties overseas.‘”

The 1988 Massacre: Final Solution for the Left

The culmination came in the summer of 1988. According to the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center:

“The massacre officially began pursuant to a fatwa by Ayatollah Khomeini in July 1988... During the 1979 revolution, the common goal of overthrowing the Shah united these movements, with each hoping that its ideology would prevail in post-revolutionary Iran. Most accepted that Khomeini was mobilizing the masses and was vital to the revolution’s success. However, in the early days of the Islamic Republic’s campaign against leftist organizations, these smaller groups bore the brunt of the clerics’ attacks.”

The fatwa explicitly targeted not only the People’s Mujahedin but all leftists. As Human Rights Watch documents:

“According to Ayatollah Montazeri, after some time a second letter was sent from Ayatollah Khomeini... to ‘eliminate’ the nonreligious and communist prisoners.”

The Iran Primer at USIP notes:

“He reportedly issued a second or related fatwa focusing on members of communist and leftist parties as well as people charged with apostasy... Leftist prisoners said that they were asked if they believed in God, if they prayed, and if they renounced atheism.”

The questions posed to leftist prisoners, according to the Boroumand Foundation’s report:

“Those men from Muslim families who declined to say Islamic prayers were sent for execution, whilst female non-believers were tortured until they agreed to pray, and this torture was inflicted, more severely, on men who did not come from a devout Muslim family.”

Estimates of those killed range from 5,000 to 30,000, with the UN General Assembly citing the higher figure. In July 2024, the UN Special Rapporteur categorized these executions as genocide.

II. The Western Left’s Complicity: Michel Foucault

The most prominent Western intellectual to embrace the Iranian Revolution was Michel Foucault. According to Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson’s definitive study:

“Michel Foucault... was working as a special correspondent for Corriere della Sera and le Nouvel Observateur. During his little-known stint as a journalist, Foucault traveled to Iran, met with leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini, and wrote a series of articles on the revolution.”

Foucault celebrated what he called “political spirituality.” As New Politics documents:

“Foucault... was precisely seduced by the popular uprising in Iran, which he claimed might signify a new ‘political spirituality’, with the potential to transform the political landscape of Europe, as well as the Middle East.”

Iranian feminist Atoussa H. warned in Le Nouvel Observateur in November 1978:

“The Western Left supposes that Islam is desirable – albeit most Left intellectuals themselves don’t want to live under Islam – whereas ‘many Iranians are like me, distressed and desperate about the thought of an ‘Islamic’ government. We know what it is. Everywhere outside Iran, Islam serves as a cover for a feudal or pseudo revolutionary oppression... The Left should not let itself be seduced by a cure that is perhaps worse than the disease.‘”

When Iranian feminists protested Khomeini’s imposition of the veil in March 1979, Foucault was silent. As The Philosophers’ Magazine notes:

“As for women’s rights, and Foucault’s claim that there would not be inequality, only difference (whatever that actually means), on March 3rd, Khomeini decreed that women would be unable to serve as judges; on March 4th, that only a man could petition for divorce; on March 9th, women were banned from participating in sport; and on March 8th, as predicted by many more pessimistic voices, women were ordered to wear the chador.”

Le Matin’s Claudie and Jacques Broyelle directly confronted Foucault in March 1979 in an article titled “Of What Are the Philosophers Dreaming?”:

“Returning from Iran a few months ago, Michel Foucault stated that he was ‘impressed’ by the ‘attempt to open a spiritual dimension in politics’ that he discerned in project on an Islamic government.”

David Frum summarizes the episode:

“Foucault perceptively perceived that communism was fading as a challenger to the western liberal order he despised. Perceptively (indeed presciently), he decided that radical Islam offered the only effective challenge to western liberalism. He welcomed this challenge.“

III. Sudan: Communists Executed, Islamists Ascend (1971–1989)

Sudan provides another clear case study. President Gaafar Nimeiry initially came to power in 1969 with communist support. According to Global Security:

“Nine members of the Awadallah regime were allegedly communists, including one of the two southerners in the cabinet, John Garang, minister of supply and later minister for southern affairs. Others identified themselves as Marxists. Since the RCC lacked political and administrative experience, the communists played a significant role in shaping government policies and programs.”

The alliance was short-lived. As Ian Birchall documented in 1971:

“Nimeiry aimed to behead the organised working-class movement by executing Shafia El-Sheikh, General Secretary of the Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation, and Joseph Garang and Abdul Mahgoub, leaders of the Communist Party.“

Following the failed communist coup of July 1971, Nimeiry destroyed the Sudanese Communist Party—one of the two most powerful communist parties in the Arab world. According to Jadaliyya:

“Atta along with others in the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) including its general secretary were executed; Nimeiry waged a campaign against the Sudanese left that it has arguably yet to recover from; and the late 1970s witnessed Sudan’s increasing dependency on foreign capital as US and Gulf alliances were strengthened, laying the foundations for the economic ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood who would seize power in 1989.”

The crucial point: the destruction of the communist left created the vacuum filled by Islamists. According to the Wikipedia article on Islamism in Sudan:

“Al-Turabi became Attorney General in 1979. Al-Turabi saw the rebuilding of the organisation after the coup and exile as a strategic choice. He also took advantage of Nimeiri’s suppression of the communists after their 1971 coup attempt.“

In 1983, Nimeiry imposed Sharia law. The Islamist organization that had benefited from communist destruction eventually seized power entirely in 1989 under Omar al-Bashir, with Hassan al-Turabi as the ideological leader.

IV. Algeria: The Sant’Egidio Illusion (1991–2002)

Algeria’s “Black Decade” offers a variant of the pattern. Here, the secular military government and secular left initially united against the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), but some leftists subsequently attempted alliance with the Islamists.

The FIS emerged from the 1988 riots. As the Wilson Center documents:

“In mid-1990, local elections polarized the country between Islamists and secularists when the Islamic Salvation Front won a stunning 54 percent of the vote... Communists, leftist labor unions, and secular parties also showed little enthusiasm as they watched the Front-dominated municipal councils demand rule under Islamic law.“

The FIS leadership was explicit about its intentions. Co-founder Ali Belhadj declared:

“to ban France from Algeria intellectually and ideologically, and be done, once and for all, with those whom France has nursed with her poisoned milk.“

Regarding democracy, FIS leader Abbassi Madani stated in December 1989 that they rejected any system that allowed laws contradicting Islam. Belhadj was “openly against democratic government, insisting only divine rule counted.”

Yet in 1995, an extraordinary attempt at left-Islamist alliance occurred. The Sant’Egidio platform brought together:

“Opposition parties, both Islamist and secular (FLN, FFS, FIS, MDA, PT, JMC). They came out with a mutual agreement on 14 January 1995... This presented a set of principles: respect for human rights and multi-party democracy, rejection of army rule and dictatorship...”

The secular parties essentially agreed to work with the FIS—the same organization that had demanded Sharia law and whose armed wings were massacring civilians. The platform failed, but it demonstrated the persistent leftist hope for alliance with Islamism against the “greater evil” of secular authoritarianism.

V. Theoretical Framework: Sayyid Qutb and the Islamic View of the Left

The Islamist position on alliances with the left was articulated most influentially by Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian theorist executed in 1966 whose writings continue to guide Islamist movements globally.

Qutb’s central concept was jahiliyyah—the state of pre-Islamic ignorance. Crucially, he applied this concept not just to non-Muslim societies but to nominally Muslim ones and especially to all secular ideologies. In Milestones he wrote:

“We are also surrounded by Jahiliyyah today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws is Jahiliyyah... We must also free ourselves from the clutches of Jahili society, Jahili concepts, Jahili traditions and Jahili leadership.”

Communism, in Qutb’s framework, was merely an extreme form of jahiliyyah. As noted in academic analyses:

“In this passage Qutb is writing about Communism, which he considers to be only an extreme form of jahiliyya.”

Qutb’s writings directly borrowed from Leninist organizational theory:

“It is necessary that there should be a vanguard which sets out with this determination and then keeps walking on the path, marching through the vast ocean of Jahiliyyah which has encompassed the entire world.”

As Books on Trial observes:

“It’s very likely that Qutb’s ‘vanguard’ idea was inspired by Leninism from the early 20th-century. The communist vanguard are the most dedicated and best educated members in the movement who would lead the revolution and protect its victories after. They’re also a political party (the Bolsheviks) who ruled the post-revolution nation.”

The key difference: Qutb’s vanguard served Allah, not the proletariat. And unlike Marxism’s vision of progressive historical stages, Qutb’s framework offered no transitional role for secular leftism. All jahiliyyah was to be destroyed, with no distinction between Western capitalism and Eastern communism.

Qutb made this explicit:

“The coexistence of Islam and modern civilization is impossible. Islam cannot accept any mixing with Jahiliyyahh, either in its concept or in the modes of living which are derived from this concept.”

VI. Why the Pattern Persists

The Asymmetry of Commitment

The pattern repeats because of a fundamental asymmetry. The left views alliance with Islamism as tactical—a temporary coalition against shared enemies (Western imperialism, capitalism, secular authoritarianism). Islamism views everything through the lens of jahiliyyah versus Islam—there is no legitimate middle ground.

As Maxime Rodinson wrote (quoted in Afary and Anderson):

“Those who, like the author of these lines, refused for so long to believe the reports about the crimes committed in the name of the triumphant socialism in the former Tsarist Empire, in the terrible human dramas resulting from the Soviet Revolution, would exhibit bad grace if they became indignant at the incredulity of the Muslim masses before all the spots that one asks them to view on the radiant sun of their hope.“

The “My Enemy’s Enemy” Fallacy

The left consistently underestimates Islamism’s seriousness about its own stated goals. When Khomeini said he would destroy communism alongside capitalism, Western leftists assumed this was rhetoric. When the FIS demanded Sharia, secular Algerians hoped they could be moderated. When the Tudeh Party supported Khomeini, they believed in the “non-capitalist path of development.”

Islam’s Civilizational Patience

Islamism plays a longer game. As the Tudeh Party’s own retrospective acknowledges, the Islamic Republic was “well-prepared” for the destruction of the party:

“The Mojahedin and leftist prisoners were completely separated in many prisons, destroying the prisoners’ established communications networks. This allowed the authorities to execute their plan in two stages—first the Mojahedin followed by the leftists—while keeping the leftists largely in the dark as to their fate.“

VII. Conclusion: The Lesson Unlearned

The historical record is unambiguous:

  1. Iran 1979-1988: Leftists supported Khomeini; Khomeini destroyed the left

  2. Sudan 1969-1989: Communists supported Nimeiry; Nimeiry destroyed communists; Islamists filled the vacuum

  3. Algeria 1990s: Secular left attempted alliance with FIS; FIS would have destroyed secular society

  4. Egypt 1950s-present: Muslim Brotherhood and secular left have oscillated between alliance and conflict; the Brotherhood’s stated goal remains an Islamic state incompatible with leftist values

The theological and ideological foundations of Islamism make coexistence with the secular left impossible. This is not a matter of interpretation but of explicit doctrine. When Khomeini declared that “the danger from the communist powers is not less than America,” he meant it. When Qutb wrote that “Islam cannot accept any mixing with Jahiliyyah,” he meant it.

The persistence of left-Islamist alliance despite this record represents one of the most remarkable failures of political learning in modern history. Each generation of leftists appears to believe that their alliance will be different—that their Islamist partners are the moderates, that this time the shared enemy justifies the coalition.

The graves of Iranian communists, Sudanese trade unionists, and Algerian secularists testify otherwise.

Sources and Primary Documents